'Cryptocurrency & Money's Uselessness. Chapter 3 - Blockchain, DAPP And Cryptocurrency (Part Two)

Below is a draft of a book that i have started writing. It will be the first book released from the Macrohard hub and will begin the process of enhancing the curriculum of 'legitimate illiteracy', the basis of an entire school that i have created, that everyone can school in.

By means of this book, i will incorporate 'legitimate illiteracy' with 'cryptocurrency', introducing is mix among participants of the Macrohard hub. Where copies of the books are sold, it will intimate the world about 'cryptocurrency' in a legitimate illiteracy way and proceeds from sales will go towards the evolution and sustenance of the Macohard hub. The Macrohard hub is currently located in the Philippines.

The video below, was recorded at the Macrohard hub and on it, i started the inception of this book:

I am trying to recover a bit from the passing of my dad. I didn't play my role as son enough and it haunts me. This book will be dedicated to my parents. By its means, may i make them proud a bit and heal in turn.

Your boy Terry

@surpassinggoogle

Proof Of Stake (POS)

‘Proof of stake’ is different from ‘proof of work’. It is another type of ‘consensus; model used by many blockchains today, to establish how blocks are produced. Underlyingly, ‘proof of stake’ also plays the role of a ‘reward-distribution’ mechanism.

Having understood ‘proof of work’, you are better-positioned to understand ‘proof of stake’. Consequently, understanding ‘proof of stake’ better-positions you to understand ‘blockchain technology’ in general.

By now, you may have begun to establish another utility for ‘cryptocurrency’, besides its popular use as a ‘store of value’ (i.e as ‘money’). Cryptocurrency can be utilized on a blockchain as a tool of governance, something you will understand better as we explain ‘proof of stake’.

For a blockchain to maintain its ‘decentralized’ nature, it needs a measure of governance; one based on ‘decentralized consensus’.

To sustain its level of ‘decentralization’, it needs a directional ‘decentralized’ economy (one that is modeled to invite ‘participation’) and such a decentralized economy needs a decentralized currency to power itself; its very own ‘cryptocurrency’.

Now, when we referred to ‘decentralized consensus’ earlier (in reference to how a ‘decentralized blockchain’ should run), that simply meant that ‘anyone should be able to participate in the ‘consensus’ process that governs a blockchain, without requiring permission from a central authority'.

Revisiting Bitcoin's ‘proof of work’ for instance, it established that anyone can set up a Bitcoin miner by investing in ‘computing infrastructure’.

Now that we have established the above, let us establish the impact of a ‘decentralized cryptocurrency’ in the successful running of a ‘decentralized blockchain’ by posing the subsequent question:

Does the existence of the ‘BTC’ cryptocurrency have any impact on how many Bitcoin miners run today?

Well, miners are incentivized to participate in producing the blocks that formulate the Bitcoin blockchain, knowing that they can receive ‘miner-rewards and miner-fees’, distributed by a decentralized Bitcoin protocol that functions automatically without the interference or permission of a central authority. These rewards are paid out in ‘BTC’, the native cryptocurrency of the Bitcoin blockchain.

In many cases, by virtue of these ‘BTC’ rewards, miners can continue to upgrade their ‘infrastructure’, continuing their role in maintaining a decentralized Bitcoin blockchain.

Quite indirectly, we can begin to see the value, perhaps ‘economic value’ of BTC in the governance of the Bitcoin blockchain.

More tangibly, we have begun to see the role of ‘cryptocurrencies’ in the survival of ‘blockchain technologies’.

Now, let us begin to pinpoint how the ‘proof of stake’ consensus model (used by many blockchains today) differs from ‘proof of work’. In the process, we will begin to identify its advantages and disadvantages in comparison to the ‘proof of work’ consensus model (used by the likes of Bitcoin and Ethereum), giving us balanced insight into the formulation of cryptocurrencies and blockchains.

This knowledge will come in handy in eventuality and when we attempt to take you through the journey of creating your own ‘cryptocurrency & blockchain’, in chapters ‘4 & 5’.

To start, let us conclude that a user's level of participation in the governance of a blockchain like ‘Bitcoin’, which makes use of a ‘proof of work’ consensus-model, isn't entirely reliant on ‘how much cryptocurrency they hold’.

A user with ‘0 BTC’ holdings can set up a Bitcoin miner, contribute to keeping the Bitcoin blockchain 'decentralized', mine blocks and earn BTC rewards.

With the ‘proof of stake’ consensus model (used by many blockchains today), ‘how much cryptocurrency you hold or control’ (referring to one’s ‘stake’) is a key requirement. In this model, even if your node is hosted on the best infrastructure, it may not be eligible to ‘produce blocks’ for the blockchain. How so?

According to the ‘proof of stake’ consensus model, ‘block producers’ of the blockchain are selected on the basis of ‘who has more stake’ (i.e ‘who holds more cryptocurrency’).

The more cryptocurrency a ‘node-operator’ stakes, the more ‘block-producing power’ his node has in comparison to other nodes across the blockchain network.

The process of ‘staking cryptocurrency’ is similar to ‘locking it’ within the blockchain network, instead of ‘spending’ it.

Ofcourse, ‘block producers’ are rewarded in the native cryptocurrency of the blockchain for their activity in ‘maintaining the blockchain’, creating an incentive for anyone to setup a node and for ‘node operators to accumulate more stake’ to compete against other nodes for better ‘block-rewards’.

‘Accumulating more stake’ in this context refers to ‘staking one’s cryptocurrency-earnings or purchasing more cryptocurrency to stake’.

The process of ‘staking cryptocurrency’ is similar to ‘locking it’ with the blockchain network, instead of ‘spending’ it.

In many cases, you can un-stake your cryptocurrency too, making it ‘liquid’ and ready to spend but with a negative impact on the ‘block producing power’ of your node.

This simply to say that ‘there is a ranking system among ‘block producing’ nodes, which is stake-weighted.

In effect, ‘nodes with higher stake’ rank higher ‘produce more blocks’ (i.e earn higher ‘block-rewards’) than those ranking lower and generally have higher influence in the decisions governing the blockchain.

Based on ‘how much cryptocurrency’ a node-operator is willing to stake as opposed to ‘spend’, he can prove to the entire network his vestment in the success of the blockchain, consequently proving his eligibility as a ‘rightful custodian’ of the blockchain.

Inversely, ‘proof of stake’ disincentives ‘disreputability’ among node operators. How so?

Since a node-operator’s influence on the governance of the blockchain is only proportional to the size of his ‘stake’ (referring to ‘how much cryptocurrency’ he has locked within the blockchain), even in the event of a ‘collusion attempt’ to take over the blockchain and tamper it’s state or alter its behavior, the entities involved will have needed to accumulate a significant amount of collective ‘stake’ (i.e significantly ‘more stake’ than ‘the rest of the network’), which typically involves buying more ‘cryptocurrency’ off the markets. Such endeavors would continuously deflate the circulating supply of this cryptocurrency, stirring a market action that leads to a continuous surge in its price. The collusion attempt becomes too expensive to be profitable.

Did we mention that most blockchains that make use of a ‘proof of stake’ consensus model have a protective mechanism called ‘an un-staking period’? Well, if we too see ‘stake’ as ‘collateral’, there are some damages incurred by the ‘un-staker’ in the event of an ‘abrupt un-staking’. In many cases, this ‘damage’ takes the form of ‘lost time’, put into effect by an ‘un-staking period’ that takes time to complete, in accordance with the blockchain’s standards.

During this ‘time’, typically ‘days’ (i.e ‘the un-staking period’), the ‘node’ involved loses the ‘block-producing power’ associated with its ‘un-staking stake’.

In the event that the ‘collusion attempt’ in our earlier scenario succeeds, the entities involved are left with so much ‘stake’ (i.e ‘vested cryptocurrency’), which they will need to un-stake, to get ‘liquid cryptocurrency’ (i.e ‘spendable cryptocurrency’) but there is an ‘un-staking period’ (likely ‘days’).

In this period, the independent users of this cryptocurrency have become aware of the hack and have begun selling their holdings in a haste, wrecking its price.

In this period, the rest of the blockchain network, made up of ‘reputable node-operators’, may have concluded that a hard fork solves the situation, where they start up a new blockchain, retain the identity and vision of the original blockchain, leaving the ‘bad actors’ on the now tampered and unregarded blockchain.

The bad actors finally unstaked their ‘cryptocurrency holdings’ and loads of it but ‘a now worthless cryptocurrency’.

In creating and tackling the ‘imperfect scenario’ above, our aim is mostly to give you general insight into how blockchains work, irrespective of their ‘type of technology’ (i.e whether POW or POS) and to highlight that the general logic behind their innerworkings and formulation are similar.

As a legitimate illiterate, let me reiterate that most of my insight here is derived from the ‘down-to-earth spaces of Mama Earth’ and an understanding of ‘life and humans’ as opposed to secular study. Looking at an so-called ‘complex niche’ from the perspective of ‘legitimate illiteracy’ and ‘everything’ is mostly as complex as ‘1, 2, 3’.

Speaking of POS, various blockchains that make use of ‘proof of stake’ to maintain a ‘decentralized nature’ (referring to ‘distributed consensus’) have their own unique ‘algorithms, models and variations’ to how they implement it, tackling tangible questions like ‘how much ‘minimum stake’ should a node-operator vest to be eligible to ‘produce blocks’ for the blockchain?’, how long should the ‘unstaking period’ be?’, ‘how much impact or punishment should irresponsible node-operators incur, when they refuse to ‘produce blocks?’ etc.

In general, each ‘blockchain innovator’ tries to answer the above questions, in the process of choosing a ‘blockchain technology’. Consequently, a blockchain’s technology can have a direct impact on the success of its native cryptocurrency.

For instance, didn’t we hint at how the ‘proof of stake’ plays the role of an underlying ‘deflationary’ mechanism, put into effect by its ‘reward-distribution model’? Based on ‘stake’ (associated with a ‘cryptocurrency’ possessing a ‘governance’ utility), a competitive decentralized economy is birthed that incites users to accumulate this cryptocurrency, creating a vibrant ‘demand’ for cryptocurrency that improves its financial value and stability.

Now, let us begin to focus on an interesting variation of ‘proof of stake’ called ‘delegated proof of stake’ (i.e ‘DPOS’). Why so?

Well, if you are new to the niche of ‘cryptocurrency’, understanding ‘delegated proof of stake’ will improve your general understanding of ‘proof of stake’.

‘DPOS’ invites participation from the ‘average user’ (referring to ‘non-node-operators’) in the governance of a blockchain as such it implements additional dynamics to the implementation of ‘POS’.

We want to emanate more ‘generation-fixers’ from this whole experience, ‘abating the rarity in the ‘great men/women’ industry’ in turn. Within the course of this book, we want to ‘bear a brother’s consequence’, removing ‘all barriers to entry’ from the

of ‘creating your own blockchain, cryptocurrency, to effect the dreams of many nations.

Let us take a look at the Hive blockchain. It makes use of the ‘delegated proof of stake’ (‘DPOS’) consensus model and it has a native cryptocurrency called ‘HIVE’.

While you can spend ‘HIVE’ as a financial asset, you can stake it to have a measure of influence on the governance of the Hive blockchain and on how the ‘HIVE’ cryptocurrency is distributed, as we will expatiate later!

Once again, on a ‘decentralized Hive blockchain’, anyone can setup a node that connects to the Hive blockchain network but a node’s level of participation in ‘block-production’ is reliant on ‘how much ‘stake’ (in ‘HIVE’) they control’, rather than on ‘how much work’ their node-infrastructure proves.

‘The more ‘stake’ (in ‘HIVE’) you control, the more influence you have on the decisions that impact the HIVE blockchain.’

Did you notice the emphasis on the word ‘control’ as opposed to ‘have’?

Well, did you already know that ‘Delegated proof of stake’ invites participation from the ‘average user’ (i.e ‘non-node-operator’) in the overall ‘consensus’ governing a blockchain, whether it is the ‘consensus’ required to ‘produce blocks’ or the ‘consensus’ required to effect a ‘fork’?

In the general logic of how the ‘proof of stake’ consensus model works, is a ‘voting’ element, used in the process of selecting the ‘rightful custodians of the blockchain’.

As a result, unlike ‘proof of work’ where ‘miners’ with the best ‘infrastructure’ win the right to ‘produce blocks’ for the blockchain, ‘delegated proof of stake’ incorporates a ‘social element’, where ‘each stake-holder of the blockchain’s cryptocurrency’ can participate in governance indirectly by voting in ‘rightful custodians of the blockchain’.

Each stake-holder’s vote is weighted according to the size of their stake.

‘Delegated proof of stake’ relegates the need for sophisticated ‘node-infrastructure’ as a requirement for running a ‘block-producing node’, a giant contrast from ‘proof of work’.

The above conclusion is indicative of the fact that ‘blockchains’ which make use of the ‘delegated proof of stake’ consensus model can generally maintain a decentralized network, on the basis of a ‘fewer nodes’ (each of ‘inexpensive infrastructure’), as the ‘average user’ now has relative influence over the ‘consensus’ proceedings that governs the blockchain, irrespective of whether he runs a node or not, by virtue of his ability to vote in ‘rightful custodians of the blockchain’ on the basis of his ‘stake’; another contrast from ‘proof of work’ where the ‘consensus’ process governing the blockchain is left entirely to the ‘nodes’ and ‘miners’ of blockchains.

You can already begin to imagine how a blockchain’s ‘consensus’ model impacts its survival.

Didn’t we highlight earlier that ‘Bitcoin’ needs ‘miners and nodes’ to maintain a ‘blockchain’; the ‘miners’ to ‘produce blocks’ and the ‘nodes’ to ensure that the blockchain is ‘true’ and ‘decentralized’?

To run a Bitcoin miner (POW), one that has the potential of ‘mining blocks’, it is very expensive! Today, it costs thousands of dollars to maintain a profitable miner.

Setting up a Bitcoin node on the other hand, isn’t too expensive but a Bitcoin node doesn’t earn ‘rewards’.

Ofcourse, one can contribute his financial resources to running a full Bitcoin node or a Bitcoin miner without the intention of earning rewards, simply to strengthen the Bitcoin network and have a measure of participation in its governance.

Whatever your intention is, whether you chose to set up a Bitcoin node or a Bitcoin miner, it requires some form of ‘computer infrastructure, an internet server and electricity’, which incurs a tangible expense.

For anyone to participate in the overall governance of ‘the Bitcoin network’, which is based on a ‘proof of work’ consensus model, they must run a Bitcoin node.

To run a HIVE node, which uses a variation of ‘proof of stake’ called ‘delegate proof of stake’, one with the potential of ‘producing blocks’ (i.e earning ‘block-rewards’), it may cost some ‘50$’ per month.

‘Nodes’ of the Hive blockchain don’t have to compete to ‘produce blocks’ on the basis of ‘infrastructure’. A Hive node running on ‘minimal infrastructure’ can still manage to ‘produce blocks’ and participate in the ‘consensus’ that governs the Hive blockchain. How so?

Stake-holders of the Hive blockchain, which includes the ‘average user’, can participate in the governance of the Hive blockchain indirectly, by voting in ‘nodes’ that should ‘produce blocks’ for the Hive blockchain.

A stake-holder’s ‘vote’ is weighted according to the ‘size of his HIVE stake’.

‘Hive nodes’ (also called ‘witnesses’) are ranked on the basis of the ‘accumulative stake-weight support’ of the stake-holders voting on them.

For instance, a witness who has been voted on by ‘5,000 Hive stake-holders’ with a collective stake-size of ‘5,000 Hive’, will rank lower than a witness who has been voted on by ‘1,000 Hive stake-holders’ with a collective stake-size of ‘10,000 Hive’.

‘Witnesses’ that possess higher ranks have better chances at ‘producing blocks’ than those possessing lower ranks.

The ‘highest ranking witnesses across the entire Hive blockchain network’, referred to as ‘the top 20 witnesses’ are left the responsibility of participating in the ‘consensus’ required to implement ‘forks’, an ‘additional responsibility’ that other nodes don’t have.

Not everyone has to ‘run a Hive node’ (i.e become a ‘Hive witness’) to participate in the governance of the Hive blockchain. The average user can participate in governance on the basis of their stake, by voting in Hive witnesses.

Such is a luxury that the ‘proof of work’ consensus model in use by blockchains like ‘Bitcoin’ doesn’t possess.

What are we getting at?

If some day, it costs ‘500$ per month’ to ‘run a Bitcoin node’ and as a result there are only ‘two nodes’ left constituting the ‘entire Bitcoin network’, what fail-safe mechanism does ‘the Bitcoin network’ have against the potential centralization of the Bitcoin network, than to look for a certain ‘Terry Ajayi’, to convince him to set up a Bitcoin node, to re-strengthen the Bitcoin network and improve its ‘decentralization’ with a third node. Otherwise, Bitcoin begins to become too ‘centralized’ to be usable!

Now what if there are only ‘two Bitcoin miners’ left to ‘produce blocks’ for the Bitcoin blockchain because it has become too expensive to run a Bitcoin miner profitably (assuming it now costs ‘100,000$’ per month); what fail-safe mechanism does Bitcoin have against the likely congestion of the Bitcoin network than to look for a certain ‘Terry Ajayi’, to convince him to spend some ‘100,000$’ in setting up a tangible Bitcoin miner.

Bitcoin’s survival is entirely reliant on the ‘size of its infrastructure’, referring to ‘the number of ‘nodes’ and ‘miners’ in its network’.

To expatiate on ‘delegated proof of stake’ in comparison to ‘proof of work’, let use the ‘Hive blockchain’ in the same ‘2 nodes left’ scenario.

Would the Hive blockchain have experienced the same ordeal as ‘Bitcoin’?

First of all, let us mention that Hive’s ‘delegated proof of stake’ eliminates the need for ‘miners’ altogether, allowing a ‘node’ to play the role of ‘producing blocks’ in conjunction with its other roles in ‘maintaining a blockchain and its decentralized nature’.

In effect, if it eventually costs the sum of ‘100,500$ per month’ to run ‘a profitable Bitcoin miner’; ‘100,500$ per month’ may be sufficient in running ‘2,000 Hive nodes’.

We can already establish that if there are ‘two nodes left’ constituting the entire Hive blockchain network, potentially compromising its ‘decentralized state’, ‘average users of the Hive blockchain’ can collectively and proactively contribute their resources to setting up hundreds of Hive nodes at a cost of ‘50$ per month’ to restore a more decentralized state to the Hive network. Alas, the Hive blockchain can attain ‘decentralization’ on the basis of ‘20 nodes’ and we will discuss how this is possible later on. Considering also that ‘block-producing Hive nodes’ earn ‘block-rewards’ (i.e paid out in ‘HIVE’, you will need to seek out ‘a certain Terry Ajayi’ to save the day.

But there is more...as we are about to see!

Using a variation of ‘proof of stake’ (POS) called ‘delegated proof of stake’ (DPOS), the Hive blockchain was modeled from its outset with the capability of maintaining a ‘decentralized status’ even on the basis of a few selected ‘block-producing’ nodes.

It accomplishes that by allowing the ‘average user’ to participate in the overall consensus that governs the blockchain, without the need of running a node themselves.

As we hinted at earlier, by simply staking their ‘HIVE’ (i.e the native cryptocurrency of the Hive blockchain), anyone can vote in ‘Hive nodes’ (i.e ‘witnesses’) that they have deemed ‘reputable’ as custodians of the Hive blockchain.

‘Witnesses’ that accumulate more ‘collective stake’ support in the form of ‘votes from HIVE stake-holders’, climb the ranks and begin to have more influence in the governance of the Hive blockchain, whether in terms of ‘block-production’ or in the ‘consensus’ associated with ‘forks’.

‘https://wallet.hive.blog/~witnesses’ provides a simple interface, whereupon you can vote on Hive ‘witnesses’ by a simple vote action that completes in ‘3 seconds’ and all you need to be eligible to vote are ‘your Hive login-credentials and some staked HIVE’.

At this stage, let us tweak our ‘two nodes left’ scenario, to create another slightly imperfect ‘2 nodes left’ scenario!

In this scenario, there were ‘2 nodes’ & ‘2 miners’ left on the entire Bitcoin network and these ‘2 miners’ & ‘2 nodes’ are operated by ‘2 individuals’, each individual controlling ‘one miner’ and ‘one node’ and these ‘two individuals’ decided to collude to tamper the Bitcoin blockchain, by allowing two ‘bogus transactions’ from a newly-created ‘empty BTC wallet’ to execute, that transfers ‘5,000,000 BTC’ into their respective wallets.

Controlling the ‘nodes and miners’ of the entire Bitcoin network, these two individuals have agreed to allow these ‘bogus transactions’ to execute in the ‘next block’, some 10 minutes away; assured that they will succeed without interference.

What mitigation is there against the described situation, except a certain ‘Terry Ajayi’ decides to disrupt their attempt by supermaning out some ‘200,500$’ to set up ‘one Bitcoin node & one Bitcoin miner’, a ‘node’ to un-validate the ‘bogus transactions’ and a ‘miner’ that has a better chance (than their ‘combined chance’) at producing ‘the next block’, just incase they are able to super-duo their way into my node to infiltrate it.

Now, if these two super-duo decide to take the route of a ‘fork’, to alter their balances on blockchain itself by implementing a ‘hard fork’ and Terry Ajayi is now likely to fail in interrupting them, with an ‘infiltrated singular node’. Let us see if we can get ‘10 tech-savvy people’ to spend ‘$500 on infrastructure per month’, to maintain ‘10 full Bitcoin nodes’ without ‘rewards’. Anyone?

Then, the ‘super-duo’ returns again, to pay these ‘10 potential heroes’ the sum of ‘1000$ each’ to relinquish the ‘control of their nodes’ or ‘shut their nodes down’. Impossible? Think thrice!

In eventuality, let us assume that our ‘super-duo’ tire out from trying to alter the blockchain, considering that ‘Terry Ajayi’ has continuously ‘supermanned his way into the mix’ and they decided to focus on monopolizing ‘block production’ instead, assured that there is only ‘Terry Ajayi’ to contend with, and total of ‘three miners’ across the entire Bitcoin network, willing to continue competing for ‘the next block’ and its associated ‘BTC rewards’ (i.e ‘miner-rewards & miner-fees’). What if they decided to pool their resources to create one formidable ‘super-miner’ at an expense of ‘500,000$ per month’ to guarantee always beating ‘Terry Ajayi’ to ‘the next block’?

Ask me if i will continue on being ‘too lazy to quit’ via ‘[email protected]’ or you can visit the ‘Macrohard’ hub to ask me, currently located in Manila, Philippines.

Altogether, we have played with an imperfect scenario, imagined by a ‘legitimate illiterate’ but you get my gist.

You’ll get my gist even more as we now take a look at how ‘the Hive blockchain’ within the same scenario. Will it fare any differently or better, considering that it makes use of the ‘delegated proof of stake’ consensus model, one that relies on ‘stake’ rather than ‘work’?

Please recall once again that ‘delegated proof of stake’ eliminates the need for ‘miners’, allowing ‘nodes’ to take up the role of ‘nodes & miners’.

As we mentioned before, the Hive blockchain can maintain its decentralized state on the basis of a ‘few nodes’ (typically ‘20 nodes’). How is this possible?

‘Delegated Proof of stake’ involves the ‘average user’, affording an average user the capability of selecting ‘custodians of the blockchain’ i.e ‘Hive witnesses’ (who validate and produce blocks for the Hive blockchain), without the requirement of setting up a node.

Anyone who possesses ‘stake’ in the Hive currency, can participate in the selection of ‘Hive witnesses', by voting.

Witnesses are ranked on the basis of the ‘accumulative stake-weighted support’ that they receive, in the form of ‘votes’ from ‘HIVE stake-holders’.

‘Top 20 witnesses’ constitute the ‘primary block-producers’ having the most influence over the Hive blockchain network, while other witnesses are considered backup ‘block-producers’ chosen at random to ‘produce blocks’, with higher-ranking backup ‘block-producers’ maintaining a better chance being picked at random, than lower-ranking ones.

Like with Bitcoin’s ‘proof of work’, which rewards ‘block-producing miners’ with ‘miner-rewards’, Hive’s ‘delegated proof of stake‘ mets out ‘rewards’ known as ‘block-rewards’ (priced in ‘HIVE’) to ‘block-producers’.

Unlike Bitcoin’s ‘proof of work’, where ‘miners’ are also paid ‘miner-fees’, considering that Bitcoin transactions are associated with fees, ‘block-producers’ on the Hive blockchain, do not earn ‘block-fees’, because transactions on the Hive blockchain are free.

All the above established, if there were ‘2 nodes left’, making up the entire Hive blockchain network and these ‘two witnesses’ decided to collude on a ‘mission of disreputability’,

50 random people and ‘Terry Ajayi’, may decide to spend some ‘50$’ each to set up 51 additional ‘Hive nodes’.

Then, without extra cost, thousands of stake-holders of the HIVE cryptocurrency may decide to visit ‘https://wallet.hive.blog/~witnesses’ to remove their votes from the ‘two disreputable witnesses’ to minimize their overall influence across the Hive network, spreading their votes among these other ‘51’ likely reputable witnesses, in a bid to restore ‘decentralization’ to the Hive blockchain network.

As difficult as ‘1, 2, 3!

It is easy to see that the Hive blockchain was modelled with ‘social’ in mind, hence it’s implementation of a variation of ‘proof of stake’ referred to ‘delegated proof of stake’, a variation that is better-fitting for ‘social’.

On the Hive blockchain, ‘nodes’ aren’t just ‘nodes’ (referring to ‘just infrastructure’), ‘nodes’ are ‘witnesses’, especially ‘reputable witness’. Well, these ‘reputable witnesses’ must have had to ‘proof their reputability’ to an entire community of Hive stake-holders to be selected into a ‘block-producing’ capacity. As such, a ‘witness’ can ‘produce blocks’ even on ‘minimal infrastructure’, via the collective support of others.

To climb the ‘witness-rankings’, improving their chances of producing blocks, witnesses have to constantly prove themselves ‘reputable’, even to average users of the blockchain, inviting further participation from the average user in the overall governance and decentralization of the blockchain.

To expand its scope of ‘decentralization’, the Hive blockchain allows users to delegate the ‘influence’ of their ‘stake’ to another user. In the same breath, a user can proxy his ability to ‘vote in or select Hive witness’ to another user.

It is important to note also that the Hive blockchain has simplified the process of accruing HIVE stake for the average user.

Not every stake-holder of the HIVE cryptocurrency has purchased their ‘HIVE’ off of the markets or earned HIVE by running a ‘Hive node’.

Some have simply earned it via ‘social activities’, like ‘ulogging, blogging, vlogging and other content-related activities’ offered on various Hive applications.

Kindly visit ‘https://hive.blog/@surpassinggoogle’ and tell me what you see via ‘[email protected]’.

Do you recall that the Bitcoin blockchain, being a ‘proof of work’ blockchain, distributes ‘100% of its reward-pool’ to ‘block-producers’ (i.e ‘miners’)?

Well, on the Hive blockchain, the ‘average user’ can earn Hive ‘rewards’ without mining it (or ‘running a block-producing witness’) because only ‘10% of its reward-pool’ is allocated to ‘block-producers’.

We had mentioned that ‘delegated proof of stake’ is also a ‘reward-distribution mechanism’. Do you recall?

Having allocated just ‘10%’ of its daily ‘reward-pool’ (referring to ‘newly-created HIVE’) to ‘block-producers’, the Hive blockchain allocates the remaining ‘‘90%’ of this daily ‘reward-pool’ are awarded to ‘content-creators’, ‘content-curators’, ‘stake-holders of the Hive currency’, a decentralized-controlled treasury.

At this stage, let us mention that it is possible for a blockchain to switch from say a ‘proof of work’ consensus model, to one that is based on ‘proof of stake’ or to ‘delegated proof of stake’. This brings us once again to the subject of a ‘fork’, which we will not expatiate on much.

To conclude this segment, let us say that, ‘different blockchains have their own standards for ‘what constitutes a fork’ and in the case of the ‘Hive blockchain’ (hive.io), if only ‘17’ of the ‘top 20 witnesses’ are running the ‘newly-proposed version of the Hive blockchain software’ at the time designated to a ‘hard/soft fork’, a consensus is reach and the fork implements’.

Otherwise, only in the case of a ‘hard fork’, the chain splits and a new blockchain is formed and an associated ‘cryptocurrency’.

The Hive blockchain resulted from a split of the ‘Steem Blockchain’. As such, the HIVE cryptocurrency was born, a currency native to the Hive blockchain!

Your boy Terry, whether bulls or bears.

I will soon resume fuller activity. I was able to bury my dad some 22 days ago, after 17 days past since he passed.

Join my Telegram: https://t.me/joinchat/GtfUvhoqQkW5U9EGboRGMw

Kind support the evolution of the Macrohard hub by purchasing a 15$ T-shirt.

Proceeds will go towards sustaining the hub: https://teespring.com/stores/surpassinggoogle

Posted Using LeoFinance ^Beta